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Abstract
Strong attacks against quantum key distribution use quantummem-
ories and quantum gates to attack directly the final key. In this paper
we extend a novel security result recently obtained, to demonstrate
proofs of security against a wide class of such attacks. To reach this
goal we calculate information-dependent reduced density matrices, we
study the geometry of quantum mixed state, and we find bounds on
the information leaked to an eavesdropper. Our result suggests that
quantum cryptography is ultimately secure.
Quantum cryptography (e.g. [1, 2]) suggests an information secure key
distribution. It is based on the fact that non-orthogonal quantum states can-
not be cloned, and any attempt to obtain information regarding these states
necessarily disturbs them and induces noise. In principle, the legitimate users
of a quantum key distribution scheme, Alice and Bob, should quit the pro-
tocol if they notice a noise. However, in real protocols, the channels and
devices are not perfect, and some errors are inevitable. As long as the rate of
errors is small, these errors must be accepted and corrected by the legitimate
users. As a result, the eavesdropper, Eve, can obtain some information on
the transmitted data, as long as she induces less errors than allowed (e.g., by
eavesdropping on a small portion of the transmitted particles). Furthermore,
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she can obtain more information using the error-correction data transmitted
via a classical channel.
To overcome these problems, privacy amplification techniques [3] were
suggested. The simplest technique uses the parity bit of a long string as the
secret bit (where the parity is zero if the string contains an even number of
1’s and else it is one). Such techniques aim to reduce Eve’s information on
the final key to be exponentially small with the length of the initial string
(or at least to be much smaller than a single bit). Unfortunately, a proof
of security must stand against an adversary equipped with any technology
allowed by the rules of quantum mechanics, and neither of the suggested
schemes is proven secure (for a different opinion see [4]); their security against
sophisticated joint attacks, which use quantum memories, quantum gates,
and delayed measurements to attack directly the final key, is only partially
established [5, 6, 7]. In this work we extend the results of [7] much further.
The first hints that privacy amplification might still be effective against
such attacks were provided by Bennett, Mor and Smolin (BMS) [8]. Suppose
Eve obtains a binary string of n bits where each bit is presented by non-
orthogonal polarization states, ψ0 =
(
cosα
sinα
)
or ψ1 =
(
cosα
− sinα
)
, with small
angle 2α between them. If each bit is measured separately, the optimal
information on the parity bit of the string, IS(n, α) = (2α)
2n/(2 ln 2), is
exponentially small with n. By measuring all particles together Eve can gain
much more information on the parity bit. However, the optimal information,
IM(n, α) = c
(
2k
k
)
α2k (with n = 2k and c = 1 for even n, and n = 2k − 1
and c = 1/ ln 2 for odd n), is still exponentially small with the length of
the string. This result (henceforth, the BMS result) suggests that quantum
cryptography is secure even when Eve knows the specification of the privacy
amplification technique, since all privacy amplification techniques are based
on similar principles.
In real protocols, Eve does not obtain one of two states with small angle
between them, but she can probe the states sent from Alice to Bob using
any technique she likes. Thus, the BMS result only provides some intu-
ition regarding the effectiveness of privacy amplification. To make this intu-
ition more adequate to realistic quantum key distribution protocols, Biham
and Mor [7] presented a restricted class of joint attacks, called collective
attacks, which can use the BMS method and result: (a) Eve attaches a
separate, uncorrelated probe to each transmitted particle using a translu-
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cent attack; (b) Eve keeps the probes in a quantum memory till receiving
all classical data including error-correction code and privacy amplification
data; (c) Eve performs the optimal measurement on her probes in order to
learn the optimal information on the final key. The underlined constraints on
the probes distinguish the collective attacks from more general joint attacks,
and enable analyzing the attacks in terms of the density matrices which Eve
obtains.
We concentrate on symmetric collective attacks in which the same translu-
cent attack is applied to each transmitted particle, and the attack is sym-
metric to any of the allowed quantum states of each particle. Such an attack
induces the same probability of error to each transmitted bit. It must be
weak, or else it would induce a non acceptable error-rate. Thus, the possible
states of Eve’s probe cannot differ much.
An explicit example of such a symmetric collective attack was presented
in [7], together with a proof of security against it. In this example Alice and
Bob use the two state scheme of Bennett [2] (with pure polarization states
with angle 2θ between them). Eve uses, in the first step of the collective
attack, the (weak) translucent attack without entanglement [9] (which we call
here the EHPP attack), that leaves each probe in one of two pure states, ψ0 or
ψ1, with small angle 2α between them. After an error-estimation step, Alice
and Bob have an n-bit string. Alice and Bob choose the parity bit of that (full
n-bit) string to be their secret bit, and Alice sends to Bob some parities of
substrings as the error-correction data[10]. In [7] we calculated Eve’s density
matrices for the parity bit while taking into account the error-correction data
she has [11]. Then, we found Eve’s best strategy for measuring the probes
and her optimal mutual information on the parity bit. For large strings and
small error-rate (thus, small angle α) this information decreases exponentially
with the length of the string n; e.g., for Hamming codes it is
I(n, α) ≤ C(n)(2α)(n+1)/2 , (1)
with C(n) = 2
ln 2
√
pi
√
(n+ 1). For a given error-rate, pe, the resultant angle
in the EHPP attack [12] is α = (tan2(2θ) pe)
1/4 , so that the information
I(n, pe) is of the order of p
(n+1)/8
e .
In terms of quantum information theory this result (henceforth, the BM
result) extends the BMS result to the case where parities of substrings are
given (error-correction code). For purposes of quantum key distribution, the
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BM result provides the first security proof against a strong attack. However,
it is restricted to attacks in which Eve’s probes are in a pure state. Unfortu-
nately, most possible translucent attacks on the two state scheme [2], which
can be used in the first step of the collective attack, leave each of Eve’s probes
in a mixed state. Also, any translucent attack on the four state scheme [1]
leaves each probe in a mixed state (at least for two out of the four possible
states).
The aim of this work is to apply the BM result to the case of mixed states.
We first demonstrate that any type of information which can be extracted
from certain two-dimensional mixed states can be bounded, if the solution
for pure states is known. Then we explicitly demonstrate, via two examples,
how to bound Eve’s optimal information (for a given induced error-rate).
We also calculate the (individual bit) information-dependent reduced density
matrices which are in Eve’s hands.
Any state (density matrix) in 2-dimensional Hilbert space can be written
as ρ = Iˆ+r·σˆ
2
so that ρ = 1
2
(
1 + z x− iy
x+ iy 1− z
)
, with r = (x, y, z) being a
vector in R3, σˆ = (σˆx, σˆy, σˆz) the Pauli matrices, and Iˆ the unit matrix. In
this “spin” notations, each state is represented by the corresponding vector
r. For pure states |r| = 1, and for mixed states |r| < 1. Suppose that χ
and ζ are two density matrices, represented by rχ and rζ respectively. It is
possible to construct the density matrix ρ = mζ + (1 −m)χ from the two
matrices (where 0 ≤ m ≤ 1), and the geometric representation of such a
density matrix ρ = Iˆ+rρ·σˆ
2
is rρ = mrζ + (1 − m)rχ. Two pure states can
always be expressed as |Φ0〉 =
(
c
s
)
and |Φ1〉 =
(
c
−s
)
, with c = cosα and
s = sinα. Using the notations of density matrices (Φ0 ≡ |Φ0〉〈Φ0| etc.) the
two pure states are Φp =
1
2
(
1 + z x
x 1− z
)
, with z = cos 2α and x = sin 2α
for p = 0 and x = − sin 2α for p = 1. If Φp is used to describe a bit p,
the receiver can identify the bit by distinguishing the two pure states. Two
(not necessarily pure) density matrices ρp in two-dimensional Hilbert space,
with equal determinants (which are equal to |r|) can also be expressed using
similar form with z = |r| cos 2α and x = ±|r| sin 2α. For two such mixed
states let us choose a state χn, and two pure states Φ0, Φ1 such that
ρ0 = mΦ0 + (1−m)χn
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ρ1 = mΦ1 + (1−m)χn . (2)
Let I be some (positive) measure for the optimal distinguishability of two
states, so that any operation done on them cannot lead to a distinguishability
better than I. From the construction of (2), it is clear that any measure for
optimal distinguishability must find that the two mixed states ρp are not more
distinguishable than the two pure states Φp [that is I(Φ0; Φ1) ≥ I(ρ0; ρ1)]:
Suppose the contrary I(Φ0; Φ1) < I(ρ0; ρ1). Then, when one receives Φp he
can mix them with χn and derive a better distinguishability than I(Φ0; Φ1),
in contradiction to the definition of I(Φ0; Φ1).
We can choose any measure of an optimal information carried by these
systems to describe the distinguishability, and it should satisfy Imixed ≤ Ipure .
Very complicated types of information can be extracted from such systems,
as for example, the optimal information on the parity of an n-bit string of
such quantum bits [8, 7]. In the case [7], where parities of substrings are
given, a solution exists only for pure state with small angles (the BM result),
and we can now use this known solution to bound the optimal information
which can be extracted from mixed states which are close to each other.
Let ρcms be the completely mixed state ρcms =
1
2
Iˆ. Also let ρ↓ be the pure
state of spin down in the z direction. Two cases of eq. (2) are useful for our
purpose: (a) ρp = mΦp + (1 − m)ρcms, where the pure states Φp have the
same angle as ρp (see fig. 1a); (b) ρp = mΦp + (1 −m)ρ↓, where Φp (which
are uniquely determined) are shown in Fig.1b. The first type of bound is
useful if ρp have a small angle α (which satisfies tan 2α = x/z), so that
the angle between the pure states β = α is also small. The second type
of bound is useful when the ‘distance’ 2x between the two possible mixed
states is small (while α might be large). In this case x is small and z positive
hence the resultant angle β between the two pure states is small (following
tanβ = tan 2δ = x
z+1
≤ x). Thus, in both cases the angle between the two
pure states is small so that I(n, β), eq. (1) with an angle β, provides an upper
bound on Eve’s information on the final key.
An explicit calculation of Eve’s density matrix as a function of pe must
be done separately for any suggested attack to obtain I(n, pe). However,
the fact that Eve is allowed to induce only small error-rate restricts her
possible transformations at the first stage of the collective attack, hence,
the two possible states of each of her probes must be largely overlapping
(for a symmetric attack). Concentrating on two-dimensional probes, this
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promises us that the second of the two cases above can always be used to
bound Eve’s information to be exponentially small. For certain examples
– the first case is sufficient, hence the angle between the two possible pure
states can be calculated from Eve’s density matrix directly using β = α.
Let us show two examples in details, to conclude that Eve’s information is
exponentially small with the length of the string. Both examples use the same
unitary transformation but are applied onto different quantum cryptographic
schemes, the two state scheme [2] and the four state scheme [1].
In our examples Eve uses a 2-dimensional probe in an initial state
(
1
0
)
.
She performs a unitary transformation U
(
1
0
)
|φ〉 (with |φ〉 Alice’s state), where
U =


1 0 0 0
0 cγ −sγ 0
0 sγ cγ 0
0 0 0 1

 , (3)
with cγ = cos γ, etc. She chooses a small angle γ so that the attack is
weak. Let Alice’s possible initial states be |φp〉 =
(
cos θ
± sin θ
)
in the two state
scheme, and |φm〉 = 1√2
(
1
im
)
(with m = 0 · · ·3) in the four state scheme. The
corresponding final states are
|Ψp〉 =


cos θ
± sin θcγ
± sin θsγ
0

 ; |Ψm〉 = 1√2


1
imcγ
imsγ
0

 , (4)
respectively. Bob’s reduced density matrices (rdms) are calculated from
|Ψ〉〈Ψ| by tracing out Eve’s particle. This operation is usually denoted
by ρB = TrE [|Ψ〉〈Ψ|], where the full formula is given by eq. 5.19 in [13]
(ρnm =
∑
µν ρnν,mµδµν =
∑
µ ρnµ,mµ). We denote this operation by ρB =
Tr
E
[
(|Ψ〉〈Ψ|)Iˆ
]
, where Iˆ is two dimensional (δµν in eq. 5.19). From Bob’s
matrices we find the error-rate, that is, the probability pe that he recognizes
a wrong bit value. Calculating Eve’s density matrix is more tricky; we need
to take into account the additional information she obtains from the classical
data, in order to obtain an information-dependent rdms. This is a trivial task
for the four-state scheme but a rather confusing task in case of the two-state
scheme.
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In case of the four state scheme Bob measures his particle in one of the
basis x (corresponding to m = 0, 2) or y (m = 1, 3). Suppose that Alice and
Bob use the x basis; Bob’s rdms are ρB =
(
1
2
+ 1
2
(sγ)
2 ±1
2
cγ
±1
2
cγ
1
2
− 1
2
(sγ)
2
)
, lead-
ing to an error-rate pe = sin
2(γ/2) which is the probability that he identifies
|φ2〉 when |φ0〉 is sent. Eve has the same knowledge of the basis, hence her
information-dependent rdms are ρE =
(
1
2
+ 1
2
(cγ)
2 ±1
2
sγ
±1
2
sγ
1
2
− 1
2
(cγ)
2
)
, so that
x = sγ , z = (cγ)
2, and the relevant angles are 2β = 2α = (tan)−1(sγ/cγ2)
(using the first type of bounds). For a small angle γ we get pe ≈ γ2/4+O(γ4),
β ≈ γ/2+O(γ3), and thus pe ≈ β2+O(β4). The information is thus bounded
by I(n, pe) < C(n)(4pe)
(n+1)/4 to be exponentially small [using eq. (1)].
In case of the two-state scheme Bob’s rdms are ρB =
(
(cθ)
2 + (sθ)
2(sγ)
2 ±cθsθcγ
±cθsθcγ (sθ)2(cγ)2
)
.
Bob chooses one of two possible measurements, M0→1 or M1→0, with equal
probability p0→1 = p1→0 = 1/2; In case of M0→1, Bob measures the received
state to distinguish φ0 from its orthogonal state φ0
′ and finds a conclusive
result ‘1’ whenever he gets φ0
′. (The conclusive result ‘0’ is obtained by re-
placing 0 and 1 in the above). The error-rate is the probability of identifying
φp
′ when φp is sent, and it is pe = (sθ)2(cθ)2[1− cγ ]2 + (sθ)4(sγ)2.
To obtain Eve’s density matrices one must take into account all the in-
formation she possibly has. If one ignores the classical information and
calculates the standard rdms (as in [14]), then the result is of significant
importance to quantum information, while it is less relevant to quantum
cryptography. Recall that Bob keeps only particles identified conclusively
(as either φ0
′ or φ1
′); Bob informs Alice — and thus Eve — which they are,
and, as a result, Eve knows that Bob received either φ0
′ or φ1
′ in his measure-
ment, and not φ0 or φ1. This fact influences her density matrices, and these
are not given anymore by the simple tracing formula ρE = TrB
[
(|Ψ〉〈Ψ|)Iˆ
]
.
In general, information dependent rdms are obtained by replacing Iˆ by any
other positive operator Aˆ:
ρE = TrB
[
(|Ψ〉〈Ψ|)Aˆ
]
(5)
(This is a rather obvious conclusion from the discussions prior to eq. 5.19 and
also from page 289 in sec. 9 in [13]; The correctness of this technique can eas-
ily be verified [15]). In our case ρE = TrB
[
(|Ψ〉〈Ψ|)(1
2
|φ0′〉〈φ0′|+ 12 |φ1′〉〈φ1′|)
]
,
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where the halves result from p0→1 and p1→0. This tracing technique leads to
ρE =
(
(sθ)
2(cθ)
2 + (sθ)
2(cθ)
2(cγ)
2 ±cθ(sθ)3sγ
±cθ(sθ)3sγ (sθ)4(sγ)2
)
. (6)
After normalization we get x = 2sγcθ(sθ)
3/TrρE and z =
1+z
2
− 1−z
2
=
[(cθ)
2(sθ)
2[1 + (cγ)
2]− (sθ)4(sγ)2)/TrρE . The relevant angles are again 2β =
2α = tan−1(x/z). For small angle γ we get pe ≈ sθ4γ2 + O(γ4), 2β ≈
(sθ/cθ)γ + O(γ
3). Finally we get pe ≈ (sθ)2(cθ)2(2β)2 + O(β4) from which
I(pe, n) can be easily calculated as in the previous example.
The information available to Eve when she performs any other symmetric
collective attack with two-dimensional probes can also be calculated using
our method. Although we do not know to find the optimal attack of that type
yet, our method can still prove security against it, since there is some (small
enough) error-rate, such that Eve’s probes have small angles between them,
and thus, our proof can be applied. The second type of bounds is usually
irrelevant when the attack is given (since Eve’s initial state is usually in pure
state), but it can be very useful for finding the optimal attack, requiring
only to find the maximal ‘distance’, 2x, between the two possible states of
the probe.
More general collective attacks can use non-symmetric translucent attacks
and/or can use probes in higher dimensions, in the first step of the collective
attack. Methods similar to ours can be used for proving security against var-
ious non-symmetric collective attacks (in 2-dimensions), but the calculation
becomes more complicated and is beyond the goals of this work. Our bounds
cannot be used when Eve uses higher dimensional probes. Indeed, in this
case the two possible states of each probe are still highly overlapping, and
the same intuition which holds in our paper shall still hold. However, extend-
ing the information bounds we found to three or four dimensions might be
a difficult task (such analysis of dimensions higher than four is not required
since they cannot help the attacker due to the reasons shown in [14]).
A more crucial issue is the possibility of finding stronger joint attacks
which are not collective. Let us present the strong argument which is the
basis for approaching the security problem through the collective attack: by
the time Eve holds the transmitted particles she has no knowledge of the
error-correction and privacy amplification techniques to be used by Alice
and Bob. She even doesn’t know which particles will be discarded in the
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error-estimation stage, and how the common bits will be reordered. Thus,
we conjecture that she cannot gain information by searching or by creating
correlations between the transmitted particles; she better keep one separate
probe for each particle, and perform the measurements after obtaining the
missing information as is done in the collective attacks. Any attempt of
creating such coherent correlations at the first step of the attack induces
error, while it cannot lead to an increase in the resultant information; indeed
it could help Eve if she would guess correctly the required correlations (e.g.,
the final string, from which the parity is calculated), but the probability of
successful guess is exponentially small. Unfortunately, proving this intuitive
argument is yet an open problem.
It is a pleasure for us to thank Asher Peres, William Wootters and Gilles
Brassard for helpful discussions.
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Figure 1: Two ways of constructing the two density matrices ρp from two
pure states Φp and a third state χn common to both density matrices. In a),
χn = ρcms, the completely mixed state. In b), χn =↓z, the “down z” pure
spin state.
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